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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LA ~L\H PEAY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
HO.\ ltD OF EDUCATION OF 
PROVO CITY SCHOOL DIST., 
a body corporate and politic, and 
MERRILL CHRISTOPHERSON, 
HAY MURDOCK, SHIRLEY 
PAXMAN, WILFORD E. SMITH, 
and LA :MAR EMPEY, 
:Members of Said Board, 
Defendan.ts and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9722 
BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANT 
STATElYIENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to decide the constitutionality and 
validity of Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, 
cited UCA 1953, 53-7-24, and the validity of the election 
held in Provo City February 6, 1962, pursuant to this act. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case is an appeal by the plaintiff, LaMar Peay, 
from a summary judgment rendered June 29, 1962, to the 
effect that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Utah Legislature in 1961 passed Section 11, 
Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, which is also cited as 
UCA, 53-7-24, and is here stated in its entirety: 
"53-7-24. VoTED LEEWAY PROGRAM: AuTHORIZED-
ELECTION REQUIREMENTS.-With the consent of a 
majority of the electors of the district voting at 
an election or elections held for that purpose in 
the manner set forth in Section 53-2-12, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, any district may maintain a 
school program in excess of the cost of the pro-
gram referred to in sections 53-7-22 and 53-7-23 
above. Said additional program shall be known as 
the "voted leeway" program of the district. Said 
voted leeway program shall not exceed an amount 
equal to 20% of the basic program of the district. 
''Consideration of such additional program and of 
modification, increases or decreases thereof by 
such elections may be initiated by a petition signed 
by electors of the district equal to 10% of the num-
ber of electors who voted at a preceding election 
on said question or by action of the board of edu-
cation. A subsequent election upon the question 
of modifying or increasing such an additional pro-
gram shall not be deemed to constitute a reconsid-
eration of the existing additional voted leeway 
program unless the proposition submitted to the 
electors expressly so states. Accordingly, a ma-
jority vote opposing said modification or increase 
shall not be deemed to deprive the district of au-
thority to continue said existing voted leeway 
program. Nothing contained in this section shall 
be construed as terminatilJg without an election, 
thereon, the authority of any school district to 
continue an existing voted additional program 
heretofore authorized by the voters.'' 
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.\ ftPr the passage of this law and pursuant to its au-
thorization the Provo City Board of Education caused an 
e1t•dion to he held in Provo City, Utah, on the following 
proposition (R-23): 
"Shall the Board of Education of Provo City, 
State of Utah, be authorized to maintain a 'voted 
lreway' program as provided in Section 11, Chap-
tPr 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, not to exceed ten per 
eent (10%) of the minimum basic program pro-
vided by law." 
In this election all persons entitled to vote for general 
office8 of the statr without regard to any property quali-
fication were allowed to vote. The result of the election 
was: 
For said proposition: 2,224 
• .f.rtai nsf said proposition: 1,829 
After this election appellant brought an action to de-
termine the constitutionality and validity of the act, the 
validity of the election and to enjoin the respondents from 
any action pursuant to the election. Respondents filed an 
answer and thereafter made a Motion for Summary J udg-
ment. This Motion was granted by the lower court and 
judgment entered dismissing appellant's complaint for 
failing to state a claim. (R-29) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant contends that plaintiff's complaint did 
statp a cause of action and asks that the decision of the 
trial judge be reversed, and that U·CA 1953, 53-7-24 he 
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1 
declared unconstitutional and a nullity and that the elec-
tion of February 6, 1962, be declared null and void. 
ARGUl\iENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATUTE RELIED ON BY DEFEND-
ANTS IN CALLING THE "LEEWAY" ELEC-
TION IS SO VAGUE, INDEFINITE, AND 
UNCERTAIN THAT IT SHOULD BE DE-
CLARED A NULLITY. 
The ''Leeway'' election causing the dispute before 
the Court is based on Chapter 104, Section 11, Laws of 
Utah, 1961 (53-7-24, DCA 1953). The pertinent part of 
this statute reads : 
''With the consent of a majority of the electors of 
the district voting at an election or elections held 
for that purpose in the manner set forth in Sec-
tion 53-2-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, any dis-
trict may maintain a school program in excess of 
. the cost of the program referred to in Sections 
53-7-22 and 53-7-23 above ... " 
A problem immediately arises, because the section re-
ferred to as 53-2-12, DCA, 1953 concerns the general pow-
ers and duties of the State Board of Education, and says 
nothing about elections. Thus the statute, as considered 
(the bill as introduced contained the same reference) and 
enacted by the legislature, sets forth no provisions for 
holding a "leeway" election. The act should therefore 
fail on this ground. It might be said that the legislature 
has made an obvious mistake in referring to UCA 1953, 
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;,:~-~-1 ~. and that it must have intended reference to an-
other section. Respondents contend that the Court should 
rPad a st atutP that was repealed before Section 53-7-24 
was I'Tl:t<'h'<l and from this reading determine that the 
!t'.gi:·dat 11re intended to include a different reference in 
th body of Section 53-7-24. They argue that Section 
;>:~-7 -~4 is a replacement for Section 53-7-8, and that since 
;,:~-7-8 made reference to 53-7-12 the Court must conelude 
that the legislature intended to refer to 53-7-12 when it 
Pnndl'd 53-7-24. (Section 53-7-12 has to do with special 
Pll'd ions called for the purpose of creating a special tax 
to buy and erect schoolhouses.) In support of their posi-
tion, respondents cite eases where the Courts have cor-
rPctPd obvious legislative errors. However, it is impor-
tant to note here that in this case the legislature at no 
time considered any reference to any section other than 
5:~-~-1~. since the bill was introduced with the same statu-
tory reference it had when it was passed. Respondents 
are therefore hard pressed to argue which section the 
legislature intended to refer to, since reference to no other 
section appears in the legislative record. 
Appellant calls attention to the fact that Section 
53-7 -~-! as passed departed in several respects from the 
repealed Section 53-7-8, and that is impossible to deter-
mine what the legislature had on its mind in referring to 
5:~-~-1~. To cite the changes between 53-7-24 and 53-7-8: 
Section 53-7-24 substituted 20 per cent for 25 per cent; it 
also left out the reference to the basic unit of $4,050.00 
plus transportation ; it also left out the first paragraph of 
the repealed Section 53-7-8 consisting of twenty-three 
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lines. Appellant submits that it is just as reasonable for 
the Court to speculate that the legislature intended to 
refer directly to the provisions governing bond elections 
as to speculate that it was intended to refer to a section 
which in turn refers to another section in order to give 
it meaning. In fact, this would appear to be the more rea-
sonable interpretation, because Section 53-7-12 must itself 
refer to the bond elections in determining the procedure 
of the elections. The problem clause in Section 53-7-24 
says: 
"With the consent of a majority of the electors of 
the district voting at an election or elections held 
for that purpose in the m.am;ner set forth in Section 
53-2-12.'' (Emphasis added) 
The word ''manner'' obviously means procedure in the 
foregoing, so if we adopt the respondents' argument we 
must say that Section 53-7-24 refers election procedures 
to 53-7-12 which then refers election procedures to the 
section on issuance of bonds. A rather circuitous route 
for something that could have been easily spelled out by 
the legislature. The appellant agrees that the Court 
should help interpret legislation so as to preserve it, but 
lacking prophetic vision or psychoanalytic insight the 
court cannot decide what the legislature would like to do 
had it the power to start all over again- the court should 
refuse to legislate, and let the legislature clearly state 
its decision with corrective legislation. 
The cases where the Court has corrected legislative 
errorts are cases of obvious errors, where it was clear 
what the legislature had intended to include in various 
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Pnnctnwnts and through error had not reflected the true 
inlt>nt thnt was patently obvious. In this case it is not 
patPntly obvious. Furthermore, those cases correcting 
oh,·iolls legislative error constitute an exception of the 
.~Pneral rule, which is stated in 50 Am. Jur. Section 232 at 
page ~1 !l: 
''Courts will not, as a general rule, undertake a 
correction of legislative mistakes in statutes. This 
principle is adhered to notwithstanding the fact 
that the Court may he convinced by extraneous 
circumstances that the legislature intended to 
enact something very different from that which it 
did enact. The question is not what the general 
assembly intended to enact, hut what is the mean-
ing- of that which it did enact." 
I f. however, we assume the respondents' position for 
pnrpo~e~ of argument, i. e. that the Court should supply 
the statutory reference in Section 53-7-24 of Section 
:l:~-1-12, we are faced 'vith another problem of determining 
what is meant hy the vague and uncertain term "so far 
ns applicable:" that is contained in Section 53-7-12. The 
pertinent part of Section 53-7-12 reads as follows: 
" ... The board of education shall give such rea-
sonable notice of such submission as it may deem 
proper, and shall follow the procedure in elec-
tions for the issuance of bonds so far as appli-
cable.'' (Emphasis added) 
Respondents maintain that if the Court inserts Section 
.):~-i-1::! in Section 53-7-24 then the procedures for the elec-
tion are completely spelled out. Defendants plead in Sec-
tion i (e) of their answer that they complied with all pro-
-I 
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visions of law in calling for, conducting, and canvat'~i 11 ~ 
the result of the election. They also specifically refer to 
their compliance so far as applicable with Sections 
53-10-3 to 6. Counsel probably intended to refer to Sec-
tions 53-10-7 through 53-10-12 since these are the sections 
which refer to bond elections, while the sections cited by 
the defendants refer to the creation of indebtedness oth-
erwise than through bonding. However, the two sections 
(53-10-5 and 53-10-11) on qualification of voters read 
essentially the same. Section 53-10-11 reads as follows: 
''Every registered voter residing in any muni-
cipal ward or school representative precinct in 
which any election is held for the purpose of de-
termining the question of issuing bonds for a 
school district who shall have paid a property tax 
therein in the year next preceding such election 
shall he entitled to vote at any such election. Chal-
lenges for cause by any qualified voter shall be 
allowed at such election and promptly decided 
by the judges conducting the same.'' 
To adopt defendants' theory, the Court would have to 
read out the qualification of voters part of the section, 
which requires the payment of a property tax, and con-
clude that the only portion of the section which "is appli-
cable'' is the last sentence on cha1lenges. This would seem 
to be a strained interpretation indeed, the effect of which 
would he to allow non-property-taxpaying voters such as 
college students and others to impose an additional tax on 
the property owners of a school district, a violation of our 
concept of fundamental rights and due process of law. 
It is interesting and significant to note that in the 
chapter on creating indebtedness by school districts (the 
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dmptPr to whieh 53-7-12 refers) there are no less than 
tin• references made to the requirement of property tax 
payments in order for voters to invoke additional tax 
burdens on property owners. See the following sections 
with t lwi r pertinent parts: 
53-10-1-
" ... but no debt in excess of the school taxes for 
the current year shall be created by the board of 
education of any school district unless the propo-
sition to create such debt shall have been submitted 
to a vote of such qualified electors as shall h(Jil}e 
paid a property taa; therein within the twelve cal-
endar months n.ext preceding such election. . . . '' 
53-10-2-
'' ... such district may cause the proposition to 
incur and create such additional indebtedness to 
be submitted to a vote of such qualified electors as 
shall have paid a property tax in amy such school 
district in the year preceding such election." 
53-10-5-
· · En:-ry registered voter . . . who shall have paid 
a property tax in such district in the year next 
preceding such election shall be entitled to vote 
at any such election .. . " 
53-10-11-
E,·ery registered voter ... who shall have parid a 
property tax in such district in the year next p·re-
cedwg such election shall be entitled to vote at amy 
such election ... " 
9 
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53-10-16-( which constitutes the form of the certifi-
cate that the County Clerk must sign in connection 
with a bond issue) : 
"I certify that the within bond is issued in accord-
ance with law, and is within the debt limit per-
mitted by the constitution and laws of the State of 
Utah, and in a.ccorda;nce with a vote of the tax-
payers of ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
To read out the property tax requirement of the bond-
ing statutes would be to ignore the provision which 
seemed to be most important in the eyes of the legislature. 
It would also violate a fundamental rule of law govern-
ing taxation legislation. We quote from Su.therlarnd on 
Statutory Con.struction, Volume 3, Chapter 67, Section 
67-1, at page 993 : 
''While the power to tax, and the exercise of that 
power is indispensable to the effective operation of 
the government, the rule has become firmly estab-
lished that tax laws are to be strictly construed 
against the state a;nd in favor of the taxx;payer. 
Therefore, where there is reasonable doubt as to 
the meaning of a revenue statute it should be re-
solved in favor of those taxed. 
'' ... A number of theories have been put forth in 
sustaining the soundness of the doctrine ... that a 
rigid application of revenue measures is for the 
protection of the citizen who should be informed 
in unambiguous terms the amount and nature of 
the tax." (Emphasis added) 
Also, see Crawford on Statutory Construction, Section 
257, page 502: 
''As a general rule, and in accord with the pre-
vailing view revenue laws, and particularly tax 
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laws, Hhould be construed in favor of the taxpayer 
and against the government. In fact, they are to 
be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer, and 
ant! s1tbstantial doubt resolved in favor of the 
cit'izen. Hence any tax proceedings must be in 
strict accord with the provisions of the statutes 
n'lating thereto. 
"This view rests, so it would seem, upon the prin-
ciple that a tax cannot be imposed without the use 
of clear and express language. To hold otherwise 
would allow the courts to impose taxation, arnd that 
would clearly constitute a.n encroachment upon the 
power of the legislature. More than that, taxation 
is a process which interferes with the personal and 
property rights of the people, although it is a nec-
essary interference. But beeause it does take from 
the people a portion of their property, seems to be 
a "~:alid reason for construing tax laws in favor of 
the taxpayer. It is also a destructive power. So 
far as property rights are concerned it occupies an 
analogo ns position to that occupied by statutes 
ll'hich restrict and destroy personal rights. Accord-
ingly, in case of doubt or of ambiguity,. that con-
struction should be adopted which opposes the 
imposition of the tax." (Emphasis added) 
It is submitted that even if the Court would supply 
the reference to 53-7-12 in Section 53-7-24, there still 
rt.'mains the problem of determining the meaning of "so 
far as applicable.'' The respondents have chosen to 
determine that the requirement for a property tax pay-
ment is not appliea ble to the leeway election. In view of 
the sections cited a hove this would seem to be entirely 
contraDT to what the legislature would have intended. It 
would also seem to directly contradict the principles of 
11 
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law governing revenue and taxation statutes :1s dt<'d 
above. 
POINT II. 
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 104, LAWS OF 
UTAH, 1961, (MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM) 
DOES NOT MEET THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS, AND THE ACT IS THERE-
FORE VOID. 
The title to Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, reads 
as follows: 
''MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM'' 
''An Act Establishing the- State - Supported 
Minimum School Program, Stating the CostR 
Thereof, Prescribing the Amount of the Contribu-
tions to Be Made by the State and the Various 
School Districts Toward the Payment of the Costs 
Thereof and the Manner in Which the Various 
School Districts May Qualify for Participation 
Therein; Enabling School Districts to Provide 
Additional School Services and Programs; Pre-
scribing the Manner in Which Tax Levies by the 
State Shall Be Made for the Purposes of Making 
Said Contributions ; Enabling the School Districts 
to Make Tax Levies; Providing for the Collection 
of Said Tax Levies by the Respective Counties; 
Providing for the Distribution of Federal Funds, 
and Repealing Sections 53-7-2, 53-7-5, 53-7 -5a, 
53-7 -5b, 53-7 -5c, 53-7-6, 53-7-7, and 53-7-8, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. '' 
Article VI, Section 23 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah reads as follows: 
''Except general appropriation bills, and bills for 
the codification and general revision of laws, no 
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bill shall be passed containing more than one sub-
jPd, ,.h i('h shall be clearly expressed in its title.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
A <'Hreful examination of the title reveals an obvious 
omission of any mention of Section Eleven of the Act, 
whi<·h purports to set up the "voted leeway program." 
It <·annot he said that the leeway program is just a part 
of the ~linimnm School Program, and that therefore it 
i~ incltult~d in tlw title. The leeway program is a distinct 
method of financing to allow individual school districts to 
,·ot<' on how much they wish to contribute for the support 
of the basic sehool program provided by the state. It is 
~t'parate and distinct, and should be treated as such by 
the legislature. This is precisely the type of thing that 
Artirl(l VI, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution was di-
rt'dl'd tow a rd. 
While very little is required in a title to satisfy this 
Con~titntional safeguard, we cannot find the ''very little'' 
in the present ease. The law is clearly summarized in 
Cra/l'ford, Statutory Construction, Section99, at page 141: 
''As has been previously indicated, the subject or 
object or an act must be expressed in its title, and 
by virtue of several constitutional provisions it 
m nsf be expressed clearly ... After all the title is 
in the nature of a label, or mark of identification, 
and is intended to give notice of the subject or 
object of the act." (Emphasis added) 
And in Section 96 of the same work, the author sets 
forth the effect of non-compliance : 
''Inasmuch as the constitutional provisions with 
reference to the title and subject matter of an act 
13 
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are mandatory, a failure to meet the constitutional 
requirements will invalidate the enactment in 
whole or in part. The precise extent of the illegal-
ity will depend on the degree of the departure 
from the constitutional requirement that an nrt 
shall contain hut 'one subject which shall be ex-
pressed in the title.' However, if two or more diH-
tinct subjects are expressed in the title, the whole 
act will he invalid. Similarly, if the statute is 
broader tharn its title, the p•art w/o the scope of the 
title will be invalid, or if the part w /o the scope of 
the title is so intimately connected with the part 
expressed in the title that the former without the 
latter does not leave a statute complete in itself 
and capable of execution, the entire act will be 
invalid. It may, therefore, be stated, as a general 
rule, since the title defines the scope of the lOIW, 
that an act earn be valid only as to the p·art ex-
pressed in the title.'' (Emphasis added) 
Since Section 11 of Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, 
is not referred to in the title, the section should be de-
clared void and ineffective. 
POINT III. 
THE NOTICE CALLING THE ELECTION AS 
PUBLISHED BY THE RESPONDENTS WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO APPRAISE THE VOT-
ING PUBLIC AS TO THE ISSUES OF THE 
ELECTION, AND THE ELECTION WAS 
THEREFORE INVALID. 
A general statement of the requirements for a valid 
notice is found at 79 C.J.S. Section 366, page 93, which 
reads as follows : 
''. . . Generally, the contents of a notice must be 
such as clearly to inform the electors as to the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
question submitted, and as to the purpose ?f the· 
proposed issue of bonds ... the bonds to be Issued 
need not be discredited nor the purpose of the 
i~Huc set forth with too great particularity, if the 
votl•r is made reasonably aware of the purpose 
and ('osf of the proposed improvement so that he 
mnv ('.rcrcise an intelligent and discriminating 
jtuf,qmenf as to his own interest and public wei-
fan•. '' (Emphasis added) 
Sl't' also the following cases which amplify the rule stated: 
Hellerv. Rounkles, 171 Kan. 323,232 P. 2d 225 
Henson v. School District No. 92, 150 Kan. 610, 95 
P. 2d 346 
Ki·ng v. Independent School Dist. Class A, No. 37, 
46 Idaho 800, 272 P. 507. 
Respondents plead in their Answer (Paragraph 7e) 
that they have complied with the provisions of Section 
;):~-10-:~ concerning notice of the election so far as appli-
enhle. The requirements of the notice as set forth in Sec-
tion 53-10-3 are as follows: 
· • (1) The time and place of holding such election. 
(2) The name of the judges at each polling place 
to conduct such election. 
(3) The hours during which the polls shall re-
main open. 
( 4) The amount of indebtedness which the board 
proposes to incur or create and for what p~ttr­
pose." (Emphasis added) 
An examination of the notice as circulated by the Re-
spondents fails to reveal any language which would clear-
15 
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ly inform the voters as to the purpose or cost of tht> pro-
posed program so as to enable them to make an intellig·t·n! 
and discriminating choice at the polls. In fact, tlJP 11ot i<'P 
skillfully avoids any mention of a tax h,,-)T neces~nry to 
support the program. The notice merely makes rl'i'Pl'<'ll<'t' 
to Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, in inform-
ing the voters of the issues. (See R-23) It would lH' 
impossible from reading the notice published by rcspolld-
ents to determine the extent of the expenditures proposed 
or the extent to which the taxpayers would face a tnx 
increase. The voters are forced to make a decision with-
out knowing how much the tax will he. 
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CONCLUSION 
In ('OtH'IH~ioH, it is submitted that the leeway elec-
tion should be declared to be of no force and effect, and 
St>dio11 ;->:~-7-:!4 should be declared a nulility. It is the 
fundion of the legislature to come forward with a clear 
nnd intt•llig-ihle law on matters of such impact and con-
l't'l'lt, nnd the voters have a right to know the cost of their 
ndionR affirming or disaffirming the proposed programs. 
It dol'R not seem too much to ask the legislature that it 
;o;pt>ll out the correct procedure to be followed in raising 
rt>\.l'lltw for public use, and it does not seem too great a 
hun!Pn that public officials follow these rules. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN 
ARTHUR H. N !ELSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MORGAN AND PAYNE 
J. RuLoN MoRGAN 
128 East Center 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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